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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
cases where such officers had come into possession of prop-
erty or money of the judgment debtor by virtue of the of-
fice or otherwise, as in the case of money deposited with
officers, or where funds or property were in custodia legis.
It is not for this court to broaden the terms of this act, or
by construction read into the act an intention which does
not clearly appear." The following year the Legislature
expressed its intent unambiguously24 and extended the right
to garnishee funds in the hands of the state and its sub-
divisions to salaries due public officers. This statute was
applied to the salary of a district attorney in Stockard v.
Hamilton.25
Several decisions have been rendered on the question of
the constitutionality of such statutes. It has been broadly
stated that statutes authorizing the garnishment of the sal-
ary or the wages of public officials or employees are within
the legislative power.26 A statute permitting the garnish-
ment of the wages of municipal and county employees, which
does not extend to those of the state, does not conffict with a
constitutional provision against class legislation, Cavender
v. Hewitt.27  An Illinois statute,28 was held unconstitu-
tional as class legislation as it did not apply to all municipal
corporations of the state.2 9
DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING APPELLATE RUL-
INGS ON SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW-
CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES-
FOLB V. STATE'
One of two defendants convicted by a judge without ajury of "operating a gaming table"I appealed from the con-
viction alleging as grounds of error, first, that the "slot
machines" in question were not sufficiently proven to con-
stitute "gaming tables" under the statute, and, second, that
the testimony of an accomplice was erroneously admitted
without corroboration. Held: Conviction affirmed. The
legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the slot ma-
chines were gaming tables may not be considered on appeal,
24 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Ch. 59, Sec. 59 127 (1929).
25 25 N. M. 240, 180 Pac. 294 (1919).
26Dunkley v. McCarthy, 157 Mich. 339, 122 N. W. 126, 17 Ann. Cas. 523
(1909); note, 22 A. L. R. 760.
2"145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A. L. R. 755 (1922).
28 Illinois Laws, 1905, p. 285.
" Badenock v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N. E. 31 (1906).
1169 Md. 209, 181 Atl. 225 (sub. nom. Ruthenberg et al. v. State) (1935).
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although if it could have been so considered the Court would
have affirmed the trial court's conclusion that they did con-
stitute gaming tables. While a person accused of crime
should not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice, yet the question of the sufficiency of the
corroboration must be left to the jury or the trial court sit-
ting as a jury. An objection that the corroboration is in-
sufficient may be addressed to the trial court on motion for
new trial but is not a ground of reversal on appeal.
The first point in the case illustrates a peculiar thing
about the Maryland legal system, i. e., the difficulty of ob-
taining appellate rulings on points of substantive criminal
law. In common law jurisdictions generally there are five
ways in which an appellate court may be called on to enunci-
ate the law concerning a specific problem of human guilt of
crime. The first is in reviewing a trial court's action in
ruling on a demurrer to the indictment. In the course of
deciding whether an indictment is legally sufficient, the ap-
pellate court may have to announce specific rules concerning
the interpretation of penal statutes or the application of
criminal defences. This device applies in Maryland and is
the one through which most of our scanty supply of appel-
late criminal law has been promulgated. However, as time
passes, indictments become more and more stereotyped and
prosecutors more astute, with the result that little appellate
law comes through this route anymore.
The second is by ruling on the relevancy of evidence
which is offered by the State and admitted or which is of-
fered by the defence and excluded. In the course of ruling
on the relevancy (as distinguished from the admissibility)
of evidence the appellate courts are frequently required to
enunciate doctrine of substantive law. Thus in Spencer v.
State,2 the Court, in the course of ruling on the propriety
of the trial Court's excluding evidence offered by the trav-
erser as to his mental condition, laid down the rule of law
as to the "irresistible impulse" defense in Maryland and
rejected that defense as part of our criminal law. Although
this method of securing rulings exists in Maryland, yet it is
one not very likely to be productive of much appellate law.
The third way is by ruling on the correctness of the in-
structions either given by the trial court to the jury con-
cerning the substantive law of the case or refused to be
given. Whenever a trial judge either instructs the jury by
granting an instruction asked by the State or refuses one
269 Md. 28, 13 At. 809 (1888).
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requested by the defense a potential ground of error exists
in the common law system generally. In various other
States the trial judge must grant prayers in criminal cases
and the refusal of a proper one is as much error as the
granting of an improper one. But in Maryland, because of
our Constitutional provision3 that the jury shall be the
judges of the law, the Court of Appeals has ruled that the
trial judge need not grant prayers unless he wishes to, in
which event he must grant correct ones, and advise the jury
that they are not bound by his instructions.4 As a result
of prayers not being compulsory in Maryland few trial
judges do grant them. Whether this is because the average
judge feels foolish in telling a jury the law and then telling
them (as he must) that they need not follow it, or because
he is jealous of his score of affirmances and reversals in the
Court of Appeals and "plays safe" and avoids a reversal
on a technicality by saying nothing, is a matter which can-
not be determined. The fact is that the granting of prayers
on the law in criminal cases is said to be rare. So it results
that, in Maryland, this avenue of presenting questions of
substantive criminal law to the Court of Appeals is usually
not available.
The fourth way is one which is totally non-existent in
Maryland. Whereas in various other States appeals may
be taken on the ground that the evidence is legally insuffi-
cient to support the conviction, this may not be done in
Maryland as the Folb case pointed out and as numerous
earlier cases also have. In other States when a court either
affirms or reverses on the point of the legal sufficiency of the
evidence it has an opportunity to enunciate the points of
substantive law which may be involved in the case. No such
rulings are possible in Maryland, save by way of dictum, as
happened in the Folb case.
The fifth way is one but little productive of appellate
law. Occasionally in civil cases not involving as such the
question of guilt or innocence of crime the solution of the
legal issue may involve the court's stating some proposi-
tion of criminal law which happens to be involved.'
* Md. Const., Art. XV, Sec. 5.
' For a recent and leading case on prayers in criminal cases in Maryland,
see Vogel v. State, 163 Md. 267, 162 Atl. 706 (1932), which refers to many
of the earlier Maryland cases in point.
r Such a case was Stansbury v. Luttrell, 152 Md. 553, 137 Atl. 339 (1927),
where the Court of Appeals had occasion to discuss the substantive law of
larceny in the course of ruling on the matter of reasonable and probable
cause in an action for malicious prosecution.
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Because of the lack of appellate review over the suffi-
ciency of the evidence and the rarity of granted instructions
there are relatively few Maryland cases on points of sub-
stantive criminal law. Frequently it is impossible to give
an answer to a question of the interpretation of a Mary-
land criminal statute or that as to which of two conflicting
views concerning the common law of crimes Maryland would
follow. If predictability as to the law is a desideratum then
our system would seem to be deficient on the criminal side.
To be sure, by the same token which deprives us of the
normal quantity of appellate law, our system functions hap-
pily because there is less chance of a guilty criminal secur-
ing a reversal of his conviction on an abstruse technicality.
The system has both its merits and demerits.
In the Folb case the Court of Appeals apparently felt
that it was desirable to settle the question of whether slot
machines constitute gaming tables under the statute. For
lack of a more appropriate device they were forced to use
that of a dictum. In view of the fact that the application of
the gaming statute to slot machines is largely a matter of
"jury law" anyhow, it is possible that the problem is now
as well settled as by any other method. Juries probably
would care little whether the court's statement were dictum
or decision, assuming that they wished at all to follow the
ruling of the Court of Appeals. But query, would it be re-
versible error for a prosecuting attorney, in a future case,
to read the Court's dictum in the Folb case to the jury in an
effort to convince them that the law was that slot machines
are gaming tables? Would the fact that the opinion no-
where contains a description of the particular type of "slot
machine" and its functioning preclude the State's Attorney
from relying on the dictum in future cases in order to per-
suade the jury?
Given administrative and judicial co-operation, it is pos-
sible to secure appellate rulings on such dubious points of
substantive criminal law. If it were desirable say, to find
out whether a given type of slot machine constituted a
gaming table, the State's Attorney, in drafting his indict-
ment, could therein describe the operation of the machine
with great particularity. Thus the question of the legality
of the slot machine could be presented on demurrer to the
indictment. Thus either on the State's appeal from the
sustaining of the demurrer or on the traverser's appeal
from its being overruled the Court of Appeals would have
an opportunity to rule on the point. As matters stand,
State's Attorneys tend to put as little in their indictments
178
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as is required, in order that they may be demurrer-proof.
This is commendable because it avoids reversals on techni-
calities. But if an appellate ruling is desirable on a minor
point, one way of getting it is to invite demurrer by adding
detail touching on the point.
The other way would be for the trial judge to give an
advisory instruction unfavorable to the defendant and hold-
ing that the slot machine constituted a gaming table. Thus,
assuming a jury conviction, the defendant could similarly
appeal and the question would be squarely presented to the
Court of Appeals. Normally trial judges tend to refrain
from such instructions and either give none or ones about
which there is no doubt. This too is normally commendable
for avoiding technical reversals. But it would seem that an
occasional technical reversal could well be risked to the end
that the matter at stake could be settled by an appellate
ruling.
The second point in the Folb case also involves the rami-
fications of our rule that the jury shall be judges of both the
law and facts. Defendant claimed a reversal for alleged
error in admitting the uncorroborated testimony of an ac-
complice. The general rule is that the traverser should not
be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice. Theoretically, Maryland has the rule." Practically
it has not, except insofar as juries do as they ought or trial
judges grant new trials because they follow the rule strictly.
The rule is of no value in an appeal of a criminal case in
Maryland.
This is because the rule differs from the other rules of
evidence in the mechanical method of its application.
'Whereas most of the other rules function in terms of exclu-
sion, so that error therein may be availed of on appeal (even
in Maryland) the rule of corroboration of accomplices re-
quires for its effectual application two procedural devices
lacking in the Maryland criminal procedure. One is com-
pulsory instructions to the jury. The other is appellate re-
view of the sufficiency of the evidence.
The usual practice in other States in applying this rule
of corroboration is for the trial judge to grant (as he else-
where must) a prayer that the jury shall not convict on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Then if they
do convict, the appellate court can review the question of
' For a good discussion of the rule in Maryland, see Luery v. State, 116
Md. 284, 292-5, 81 Atl. 685 (1911). Other Maryland cases in point are:
Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 Atl. 1058 (1909) ; Garland v. State, 112
Md. 83, 75 Atl. 631 (1910) ; Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 83 Atl. 759 (1912);
and Wolf v. State, 143 Md. 489, 122 Atl. 641 (1923).
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whether there was any corroboration, although it is usually
stated that the amount thereof is for the jury. But in
Maryland the trial judge cannot be compelled to grant the
prayer and the appellate court, as pointed out in the Folb
case, cannot review the question of whether there was even
any corroboration. As a result we practically do not have
the rule, short of the jury's or the trial judge's willingness
to enforce it.
In the Folb case the defendant apparently contended
that the corroboration rule should also be enforced by ex-
cluding the evidence if it were not corroborated or (inferen-
tially) by ordering the striking out of it if admitted on con-
dition of later corroboration which did not materialize. But
for the appellate court to have done that would have been
for it to have gone into the sufficiency of the evidence, which
it cannot do. So it rejected the defendant's contention
along these lines.
Thus it is that in Maryland the only significance of the
rule of corroboration is that the traverser's counsel can
harangue the jury not to convict without corroboration and
he can move the trial judge to grant a new trial if they seem
to do so. But if both jury and trial judge turn him down
that is the end of it. It is possible for a defendant to be
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
because of our belief that the jurors, as the judges of the
law, must have found legally sufficient corroboration.
